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15 April 1948

**MEMORANDUM FOR: THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR**

**Subject: Special Meeting of SANACC Subcommittee**

1. A special meeting of the SANACC Subcommittee on Special Studies and Evaluations was held this morning to discuss various problems with Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, who is presently in charge of Civil Affairs activities for the Army in New York City. Besides the regular members of the Subcommittee, Mr. Fred Goshner of the Department of State and Captain Campbell from the Navy attended.
2. General McClure started with the positive observation that there should be a psychological warfare organization established immediately under a single head. He spoke about the interminable conflicts between OWI and OSS during the last war, and said that the division of black and white between the CIA and State is bad organization. In peace-time he felt that the Department of State should take the lead in any planning type of committee, such as the Policy Group under NSC 4, but if the inevitable happens and war does break out, then the leadership would swing from State to Military.
3. In keeping with the idea of preparedness, he is convinced that each of the Branches of the Armed Services should set up a military unit in this field at the present time. From such units in the military establishment, officers would be available for detail to the central planning group.
4. One of the main problems he experienced at the theater level was the constant tendency toward useless "dog-fights" between OWI, OSS and the Military. Accordingly, he is convinced that the director of psychological warfare activities in the theater must be a military man on the staff of a theater commander. He would, of course, have certain technical operating relationship with the organization of the national director of psychological warfare, but all directives would go to him from the Joint Chiefs.
5. During the last war, many theater commanders were unwilling to recognize the importance or necessity of psychological warfare. Hence, any committee operating in this field in Washington should be positive in recommending that a psychological warfare organization should be an integral part of the work and operations of each theater.

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**SECRET**

**SECRET**

25X1 6. Mr. [ ] kept injecting himself frequently into the discussion, talking about his experience in Southeast Asia while he was a member of OWI. Since we were convened to listen to General McClure, I felt that [ ] was perhaps attempting to impress the General with his background and experience in this field.

25X1 7. General McClure made a flat statement that CIA should have nothing to do with black propaganda. He stressed that black propaganda is too frequently tied in with subversive activities. Thus he reiterated his previous stand that all propaganda, black and white, should be under one head.

8. Mr. Oechener, who was an assistant to General McClure during the war, stated that one of the problems of his working committee under NSC 4 is whether they coordinate "facilities" or "activities." He stated that the work of his committee would be greatly limited by narrow interpretation that they merely coordinate "facilities", since this would infer that they were concerned merely with particular media and not substantial organizational planning. General McClure supported Mr. Oechener's views and felt that the NSC 4 committee should have rank, prestige and authority to decide on the use and method of use of information.

9. The General felt that research in the field of psychological warfare was very essential because without it we have no adequate or proper evaluation of the effectiveness of our efforts and the method of improvement. He stated that he would like to see many experienced civilians, who did splendid work while with the Armed Services during the last war, utilized today in the development of techniques and in present their estimation of the shortcomings of psychological warfare during World War II, with suggestions for improvement.

25X1 10. Captain [ ] stated that the current question was where to place the proposed National Security Information Agency since the National Security Council felt that by setting up another agency under the Council, too many operating problems would neutralize the effectiveness of the "advisory" character of the Council. General McClure didn't see where else such an organization could be placed. It could not be under the Joint Chiefs because the Department of State must have top representation in such an activity.

11. General McClure was unequivocal in his stand that a psychological warfare agency must have its own intelligence functions of collection, evaluation and dissemination. He stated that the requirements and use of information are so different that it is not practicable to rely upon the work of G-2 or any other intelligence group. Because of this viewpoint, initial friction existed between the psychological warfare activities and

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

those of G-2. However, when G-2 realized the difference in the kind of information that was being sought and utilized by the psychological warfare personnel, such frictional difficulty disappeared. To support his viewpoint, General McClure spoke about the method of interrogating prisoners and the [REDACTED], both of which brought reactions of individual people.

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12. The General then spent some time in describing some of the techniques which were used under various circumstances and spoke about improvements which he felt should be effected. Since these particular comments were in response to a question from [REDACTED] Mr. Gechter told [REDACTED] that the NSC 1 committee was now in the process of assembling all such information.

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13. In adjourning General McClure stated that he would be glad to come back at any time since he was located only a short distance [REDACTED]

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**MEMBER, ICAPS**

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